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Post by christrott on Apr 6, 2019 23:22:06 GMT
Walter, I'm sorry, but you are ignoring the forest for the trees. Yes, the "conclusion" said they followed procedures. However, the data trace for the FDR and the ACTUAL EVENTS say they didn't. They didn't disconnect the Auto-Throttle AS REQUIRED by the Boeing bulletin, the new manual items (which the pilot had recieved "training" for), and should have been in the aircraft's checklists as required by the 2 applicable ADs in effect for the 737MAX at the time of the accident. That failure made it nearly impossible for them to manually trim the aircraft.
I don't know why you are so intent on blaming Boeing and ignoring the training failures. Yes, I understand the pilots are dead and can't defend their actions, but that's not who I blame in this - I blame the system. The system that continues to reduce training required despite many groups (including manufacturers) continually warning against it. I blame companies who place over-reliance on automation versus actually learning basic flying skills. It's not just these 2 accidents that is the problem. In Indonesia, there have been 12 accidents involving transport-category or airline-operated aircraft since the Lion Air accident, 2 of which were fatal.
We have an increasing number of accidents recently that were caused by training, experience, and lack thereof. Air France 447, Asiana 214, Lion Air 610, Ethiopia 302, TransAsia 235, and there are more. All of these accidents have happened in the last 15 years. This is the trend no regulatory agency is addressing. I don't agree with the FAA's 1500 hour rule, but I also don't agree that a pilot should be able to fly a transport-category airplane carrying passengers for hire with less than 500 total. It's well proven that there is a "red zone" in a pilot's career from approx. 200 to 500 hours where they are most likely to have an accident. We made huge strides over the years eliminating accidents, but now we've gotten a new wave and all the focus has been on automation when it really needs to be on the training which makes automation "better" than the pilot and then when it fails, the pilot isn't able to handle the issue.
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Post by Herman on Apr 7, 2019 13:19:08 GMT
Sorry Chris, but your initial analysis from the previous page does put the blame for this disaster soley on the pilots for not flying the airplane properly and not following the Boeing procedure.
Reading your report of the CVR and FDR, I am still a bit confused as to the correct operation of this System. All this buissnes of.... Stab-Cut-Out Swtchs.... Engaged/ Disengaged...Auto Pilot On/OFF....Flaps UP/Down seem a bit confusing to me.
I fully agree with your points regarding "Training" and "System Failures" and Boeing's hurry to get this airplane into service because Airbus and their Neo A320 was a threat.
Herman
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Post by christrott on Apr 7, 2019 13:40:34 GMT
Herman,
Yes, MCAS is a flawed system. That is known. However, it isn't a FATAL flaw. It is the lack of basic training that made it fatal. Just as the pitot icing flaw on the A330/340 series of aircraft isn't a FATAL flaw, yet it was the initial malfunction that led to the AF447 crash. The malfunction was a contributing factor, of course, but it wasn't the primary cause. The primary cause was the crew not following procedures and not having the basic skills needed to deal with the situation they were faced with.
MCAS's operation is extremely simple - in case of a stall while in a clean configuration that is not immediately responded to, MCAS commands nose down trim to assist the pilot in getting the nose down. The edge case Boeing identified was that if the aircraft entered an accelerated stall while in the clean (flaps up) configuration at high power settings, the elevator may not have enough authority on its own to get the nose down due to the change in engine position and power. So MCAS was designed to assist the problem by pushing the stabilizer down to give additional authority. In normal operation, MCAS would function once and then the airplane would recover and there would be no need for a second operation, but Boeing kept it in just in case. They didn't realize that there might be a situation where one AoA vane (again an extremely simple and resilient system) would fail in such a hard manner but not in such a way to create a hard error and be disabled by the Air Data Computer. MCAS is only active when the autopilot is off and the flaps are up. Up until the time the crew retracted the flaps, MCAS was not operating. Had they simply worked the problem as required (left the plane "as is" while figuring out why the Stick Shaker was active on the captain's side) instead of trying to fly a normal departure procedure (if the stick shaker is operating, why are you retracting the flaps and possibly making the stall worse?) MCAS would have never activated and never been an issue.
As for Boeing's hurry - I think that is overstated by the media. The 737MAX was in development for 6+ years. Yes, they were only flight testing it for about a year, but being that the main change between the 737NG and 737MAX was the engines and cockpit, the need for flight testing was limited since it was a modification of an existing design. They didn't stretch the fuselage, they didn't change the wing, so the vast majority of the operations were the same and well proven. Yes, the FAA oversight was lacking. Yes Boeing did not properly notify of the changes. But I still don't agree that they "rushed" any more than Airbus "rushed" to get the A380 into service, or the engine manufacturers rushed their engines for it into service resulting in serious blade and cowling failures for them. Sometimes things don't fail when you're testing because there are unknown biases you're not aware of in your test program. Putting anything (software, airplanes, vehicles, any item) out into the world is sometimes the only way you find the flaws because the general public will be your hardest users.
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Post by walterleo on Apr 7, 2019 15:47:05 GMT
Hi:
As always with aviation there is a big effort necessary to explain and understand an accident. So better to stay with the interpretations of the competent authorities more so if there is a consensus around the world among them, that something with the MCAS is at fault and the manufacturer and the FAA have accepted that. That BOEING could have a credibility and/or marketing problem deriving from the two crashes is not new to other airplanes also: Dehavilland and Douglas stand out as the most prominent loosers in the credibility play. And credibility can be lost even having the best intentions. Maybe its cruel, but why should one book a flight in a new airliner which crashed so dramatically two times and aviation authorities around the world forebade to fly? That the boss of LUFTHANSA declared "we have confidence in the B 737 MAX" is a nice statement but will help that? One of the former bosses of the same airline declared many years ago "Our DC-10s are safe!" Did not help to boost the selling of the DC-10. The longer now it takes to correct the problems of MCAS (software, training etc) the wider will open the credibility gap. BOEING had handled problems like the thrust reveser of the B 767 quickly and without blaming errors on part of LAUDA AIRs maintenance (which where present over a long time!). Thence BOEING acted like in the Japanese saying: Solve the problem and not who is to blame.
Kind regards
Walter
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Post by Herman on Apr 7, 2019 15:50:28 GMT
OK.....thank you Chris for giving me a better understanding of this MCAS. Before rendering any further dialog, I need to digest( at my age it takes a bit more time), and refer back to the series of events relating to the actions of the flight crew. Yes, I agree that not all flaws and problems that can occur during normal airline operations can be uncovered during the flight testing and certification program. Stick shakers and AOA indicators have been in use for many years. I don't recall there having been all that many incidents of commercial airliners entering stalls. By adding devices like MCAS only encourages manufactures and airlines to allow less training and fewer flying hours for pilots to operate their airplanes. On the other side of the equation, I do have to admit reluctantly, that according to statistics flying has become much safer over the years ( I think). I think being an old fart now, my views are a bit biased. Herman
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Post by walterleo on Apr 12, 2019 20:16:35 GMT
Hi friends:
Only wanted to share an opinion of somebody who knows really what he is talking about:
cited in NYT today 12th of April 2019
Kind regards
Walter
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Post by walterleo on Dec 24, 2019 9:33:10 GMT
Hi Friends:
After long months without a solution and still vague declarations of MR. Muilenburg, he was fired finally. Even the argument, that he was not the BOEING boss when the decisión to update 737 NG to Max was taken, did save him finally. This last "victim" of the tragedies will not bring back to life the 346 humans and that will be the real tragedy not the loss of confidence for BOEING or the FAA. But all which was written and said to blaim people at the helms of the airplanes (or the servicemen) backfired now finally against the man at the helm of BOEING.
Kind regards
Walter
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