AIR NEW ZEALAND DC10 DIGEST
Feb 4, 2015 23:27:19 GMT
aerofoto - HJG Admin, Falcon, and 2 more like this
Post by aerofoto - HJG Admin on Feb 4, 2015 23:27:19 GMT
AIR NEW ZEALAND DC-10 DIGEST
From July 1971 Australia's QANTAS AIRWAYS commenced its transition from B707-320C's to B747-200B's (ordered as B747-100's during 1967 and then revised to -200's during 1969) .... after having entered the jet age with B707-138's during July 1959. The airline might have become a DC-8, rather than B707, operator had the DOUGLAS AIRCRAFT COMPANY been willing to entertain the airlines requirement for a shorter longer-ranging aircraft to enable flying its lengthy trans-Pacific route, between Australia and the US west coast, more directly.
On January 11th 1972 QANTAS operated the very first B747 flight to New Zealand/Auckland (VH-EBD "City Of Perth") .... as a non-revenue/promotional flight .... and commenced regular Sydney/Auckland service with the type from December 8th 1972 (VH-EBA "City Of Canberra"). BRITISH AIRWAYS commenced B747-100 services to Auckland from May 22nd 1975 (operated by G-AWNG) .... followed by PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS with B747-100's from June 23rd 1976 (operated by N743PA "Clipper Derby") and later B747-SP's.
QANTAS was the first Australasian airline to join the jet set and the first to enter the "JUMBO" era. Being a large (then) state-owned international flag carrier of a greater and more prosperous nation (than New Zealand), with an established and extensive around-the-world route network, it could justify such dramatic fleet upgrades much earlier during its development.
AIR NEW ZEALAND .... by comparison .... was not only a much smaller operator than QANTAS, but, hardly a global/international carrier either (beyond its established services to Australia, the South Pacific region, and both the US West Coast and the Orient) among the worlds principle airlines. It had also been a relatively late entrant to the jet age too and upon its introduction of DC-8-52's from July 1965 .... the last of which was acquired by the airline during October 1971.
However .... the jumbo era had been dawning throughout the late 1960's and most of the worlds major international airlines were already committed to fleet upgrade programs, in order to remain competitive and enable their adaption to the bulk travel concept of civil aviation being promoted through development of the new and larger/high capacity first generation wide-body jetliners which were about to enter service during the early 1970's.
For a small international operator .... like AIR NEW ZEALAND .... the B747 was simply too large an aircraft to suite the its particular operational requirements of the early 1970's, but, the airline was none-the-less cognizant of the need to upgrade and modernize in order to fulfill its ambitions in the long term .... to secure its established market/route network through increased service frequencies, to extend services further abroad and beyond the perception of the airline being a regional South Pacific carrier, to meet market expectation for higher service standards being promoted by improved comfort/facilities provided aboard aircraft such as the B747 and other wide-body jetliners, and to enhance its logistical capabilities beyond the limitations of its otherwise superb DC-8 fleet.
The DC-8 SUPER 62 had the required range and the larger DC-8 SUPER 63 the anticipated capacity based on the airlines forward planning and projected growth into the 1970's .... whilst also ensuring commonality with its existing DC-8-52 fleet, but, as attractive as these more capable DC-8 versions appeared they were also rapidly becoming old technology too .... coupled with McDONNELL-DOUGLAS having announced its intention to terminate the production of its narrow-body late 1950's/early 1960's derived DC-8 during 1972 in favor of launching its modern and technologically advanced wide-body DC-10 .... in competition with both the B747 and L-1011 TRISTAR.
AIR NEW ZEALAND's late 1960's/early 1970's studies into the most suitable JUMBO TYPE successor to its dependable DC-8 fleet therefore focused on both the DC-10 and L-1011. Despite significant political persuasion/leaning toward the L-1011, the airline eventually favored the DC-10. The early 1970's debacle between LOCKHEED, ROLLS ROYCE, and both the US and British governments .... and perceived uncertainty this may have imposed (at the time) in regard to the future of the L-1011 program (heavier and longer ranging developments of these aircraft in particular) and even the RR RB211 turbofan engine, undoubtedly contributed to this decision being swayed/clinched in favor of McDONNELL-DOUGLAS and the DC-10 .... combined with the fact that TEAL/AIR NEW ZEALAND had already established and maintained a respectable relationship with DOUGLAS since the mid 1950's and the airlines DC-6 days .... and which had ultimately resulted in the airlines (albeit belated) mid 1960's jet set membership through its re-equipping with DC-8's.
On September 15th 1970 .... a contract was signed between AIR NEW ZEALAND and McDONNELL-DOUGLAS AIRCRAFT CORPORATION for the purchase of 3 long-range wide-body DC-10-30 aircraft for delivery between January 1973 and January 1974.
AIR NEW ZEALAND's first DC-10-30, ZK-NZL (C/N # 47846 L/N # 69), performed its maiden flight from the McDONNELL-DOUGLAS facility at, Long Beach, California, USA, on October 26th 1972 and was delivered to the airline, at Auckland, New Zealand, on January 27th 1973, under the command of captain Phil LE COUTER. This particular aircraft entered commercial service with the airline, operating between Auckland and Sydney, on February 3rd 1973.
DC-10-30 ZK-NZL (1973)
ZK-NZL then operated the airlines first Auckland/Nadi (Fiji) DC-10 service on February 7th 1973 .... and from April 2nd 1973 commenced the first of a 3 times weekly DC-10 service between Auckland and Los Angeles via Honolulu. From October 28th 1973 this frequency was increased to 4 DC-10 services per week to the US west coast with the introduction of an additional service to Los Angeles via Papeete (Tahiti) .... after the delivery of AIR NEW ZEALAND's 2nd DC-10-30, ZK-NZM (C/N # 47847 L/N # 116 F/F July 13th 1973), on September 15th 1973.
DC-10-30 ZK-NZM (1975)
On October 30th 1973 AIR NEW ZEALAND operated its first DC-10 service to Singapore via Sydney .... followed by the airlines first Christchurch/Sydney DC-10 service on October 31st 1973, then its first Auckland/Melbourne DC-10 service on November 3rd 1973.
Whilst the "JUMBO" era had, by this time, dawned upon New Zealand, development of the countries principle international gateway airport, at Auckland, had, since its November 24th 1965 opening (officially commissioned on January 29h 1966), lagged behind realities of the rapidly approaching age of mass air transportation .... with its terminal and ramp facilities struggling to cope with both increasing aircraft movements and the capacity of larger wide-body jetliners by the early 1970's. A mentality of procrastination (accented by political indecision and short-sightedness, improper planning, buck-passing, and later industrial relations issues too) had not only restricted development of the airport, and AIR NEW ZEALAND to some extent also .... but .... had similarly inconvenienced foreign operators serving Auckland. Although a runway extension project was completed during 1972 .... in anticipation of the airport handling larger, heavier, and longer-ranging aircraft .... the construction of larger and more modern terminal and ramp facilities at Auckland was not commenced until early 1973 and completed until late 1977 .... almost 12 years after the airport first became operational, 5 years after the first wide-body aircraft types had already begun servicing it, and some 8 years behind schedule given that the original terminal facilities were considered "temporary" even at the time of their 1966 commissioning.
AIR NEW ZEALAND's 3rd DC-10-30, ZK-NZN (C/N # 47848 L/N # 136 F/F December 6th 1973), was delivered to the airline on January 19th 1974.
DC-10-30 ZK-NZN (1976)
As the longer-ranging DC-10's were phased-in DC-8's continued to supplement the airlines services to Sydney and Melbourne, and other destinations from both Auckland and Christchurch, and to Australian ports from Wellington .... in particular (which could not accommodate the DC-10's). DC-8's also introduced new jet services throughout AIR NEW ZEALAND's South Pacific regional network from Auckland .... to Nadi (Fiji), Pago Pago (American Samoa), Rarotonga (Cook Islands), Papeete (Tahiti) .... a service originally known as "The Coral Route" (later "The Hibiscus Route") that was inaugurated in December 1951, using SHORT SOLENT flying boats during the airlines earlier TASMAN EMPIRE AIRWAYS LIMITED (TEAL) days, and which operated until September 1960 when these aircraft were finally withdrawn from service and the route then serviced by DC-6 prop liner and later L-188 ELECTRA turboprop land-planes which were acquired during 1954 and 1959 respectively. From 1974 DC-8's also operated additional Auckland/Honululu (Hawaiian Islands) services through AIR NEW ZEALAND's established Pacific islands route network .... and introduced a new Christchurch/Wellington/Nandi service.
The airlines acquisition of DC-10's and its associated modernized image through the introduction of such advanced/hi-tech wide body jet equipment were timely in that New Zealand hosted the 10th British Commonwealth Games, at Christchurch, during January 1974, and for which both AIR NEW ZEALAND and NEW ZEALAND NATIONAL AIRWAYS CORPORATION were awarded "Official Carrier" status on international routes to/from New Zealand and over domestic routes throughout the country respectively. During this period both carriers were operated as separate state owned airlines .... with AIR NEW ZEALAND, the countries international flag carrier, flying all services to/from New Zealand, and NZNAC, the countries national flag carrier, flying most domestic air services between all major provincial centers within New Zealand. During the 1973 lead-up to the 1974 Commonwealth Games, and for a period afterward, the AIR NEW ZEALAND fleet supported decals featuring the official games logo and a legend bearing the titles "OFFICIAL AIRLINE TO THE XTH BRITISH COMMONWEALTH GAMES 1974 CHRISTCHURCH NEW ZEALAND" on the lower port fuselage of each individual aircraft .... whilst the NZNAC fleet supported the official games logo and a legend bearing the titles "THE NATION'S AIR CARRIER" on the port nose of each individual aircraft.
DC10-30 ZK-NZM (1973) - "Official Carrier To The Xth British Commonwealth Games 1974 Christchurch New Zealand" legend only
DC10-30 ZK-NZL (1974) - "Official Carrier To The Xth British Commonwealth Games 1974 Christchurch New Zealand" legend and logo
From January 1974 an inter-change agreement was commenced between AIR NEW ZEALAND/BRITISH AIRWAYS. This arrangement resulted in the airlines DC-10's being operated by BRITISH AIRWAYS, and flown and staffed by BA crews, on daily Los Angeles/London/Los Angeles services .... and which preceded the airline eventually operating its own twice weekly Los Angeles/London services which commenced (with B747-200's) from August 25th 1982. The aircraft which operated these services remained in definitive AIR NEW ZEALAND livery .... with just their seat head-rests and cabin service items bearing the BRITISH AIRWAYS brand. During this period AIR NEW ZEALAND also contracted to purchase 3 additional DC-10-30 aircraft for delivery prior to the end of 1975.
DC-10's began operating all AIR NEW ZEALAND Auckland/Sydney/Singapore services from March 16th 1974 .... and all Auckland/Los Angeles services from April 1st 1974, and all Auckland/Melbourne services from April 13th 1974 .... followed by all Christchurch/Sydney services from April 24th 1974.
ZK-NZP (C/N # 46910 L/N # 182 F/F November 8th 1974) was delivered to the airline on December 14th 1974 .... to become AIR NEW ZEALAND's 4th DC-10-30.
During 1974 the cargo door locking mechanism on DC-10 aircraft came under scrutiny and was eventually modified after a non-fatal failure of the port rear mail hold door on an AMERICAN AIRLINES DC-10-10 (N103AA) during climbout over Windsor, Ontario, USA, on June 12th 1972 .... but .... which was also followed, 21 months later, by another failure of the same cargo door on a TURKISH AIRLINES DC-10-10 (TC-JAV), on March 3rd 1974, shortly after its departure from Paris, Orly International Airport, and which resulted in the loss of all hydraulics, a consequential loss of flight control, and the catastrophic loss of both the aircraft and 346 lives. This became the worlds worst air disaster at the time. A known flaw within the design of DC-10 cargo door locking mechanism, prior to the types service entry, was responsible for both the AA and TK events. It should never have occurred, and its modification should have been made mandatory immediately after the AA incident, but, what resulted was a simple "gentlemens type agreement" between McDONNELL-DOUGLAS and the FAA in order to address this particular issue .... in preference to the issuing of an airworthiness directive against the DC10 at such an early/critical stage of the aircraft marketing .... but .... which was ultimately never fully implemented before the Paris crash. The FAA's response to aviation safety after these particular events may account for its reaction to "a perceived crisis" which was to impact the DC-10 5 years later .... during 1979 .... and which had long-term consequences for both the aircraft and McDONNELL-DOUGLAS.
The upgrading and modernization of the instrument landing aid system at Auckland International Airport during the mid 1970's enabled the advanced A/L technology of the DC-10 to be utilized .... with the first "fully automatic" landing by an AIR NEW ZEALAND DC-10 aircraft being performed, at Auckland, on January 21st 1975.
On February 21st 1975 AIR NEW ZEALAND's 5th DC-10-30, ZK-NZQ (C/N # 46911 L/N # 189 F/F January 8th 1975), was delivered to the airline.
From April 25th 1975 the frequency of AIR NEW ZEALAND services to the USA was increased to 8 services per week .... with the introduction of a Christchurch/Los Angeles service via Auckland, Nadi, and Honolulu.
The airlines 6th DC-10-30, ZK-NZR (C/N # 47849 L/N # 213 F/F August 22nd 1975), was delivered to AIR NEW ZEALAND on October 3rd 1975 .... and on November 8th 1975 the airline operated its first DC-10 service to Noumea (New Caledonia).
AIR NEW ZEALAND operated its first Auckland/Rarotongs DC-10 service on January 12th 1976 .... and began operating its Auckland/Singapore services direct, with DC-10's, from April 3rd 1976. The airline also commenced DC-10 services to Hong Kong via Sydney and operated its first Auckland/Brisbane DC-10 service .... both on April 4th 1976.
ZK-NZS (C/N # 46954 L/N # 227 F/F April 29th 1976) was delivered to the airline on June 8th 1976 .... to become the AIR NEW ZEALAND's 7th DC-10-30.
From November 3rd 1976 AIR NEW ZEALAND's Auckland/Los Angeles frequency was again increased .... to 9 services per week .... with the introduction of an additional service via both Nadi and Honolulu .... followed by its first Christchurch/Brisbane DC-10 service on December 18th 1976.
AIR NEW ZEALAND commenced the disposal of its DC-8 fleet during March 1976 .... with the sale of ZK-NZF to McDonnell-Douglas on March 25th 1976 (for lease to CYPRUS AIRWAYS as 5B-CAC .... later re-registered N99862), followed by ZK-NZG which was sold to EVERGREEN INTERNATIONAL AIRWAYS (N800EV) on September 27th 1976 .... both of these DC-8's were acquired post DC-8-50 production and from UNITED AIRLINES during late 1971. On January 14th 1977 DC-8 ZK-NZA was also sold to EVERGREEN INTERNATIONAL AIRWAYS (N801EV) .... and which reduced the airlines DC-8-52 fleet to 3 aircraft (ZK-NZC, ZK-NZD, and ZK-NZE). By this time D-C8's primarily serviced Australian ports from Wellington (a route operated in conjunction with QANTAS AIRWAYS at the time) and also extended one of the airlines Auckland/Rarotonga services to Honolulu from 1977.
From February 15th 1977 AIR NEW ZEALAND commenced the first of a series of scenic day-trips over Antarctica .... the inaugural flight being operated under the command of captain Ian GEMMELL. These popular tourist flights operated from Auckland and overflew either the McMurdo or South Pole regions of Antarctica (the actual region overflown being dictated by prevailing Antarctic meteorology on the day of each flight) during the southern-polar summer/daylight season, returning to Auckland via Christchurch .... a round-trip of some 11 hours flying time, covering some 5,600 miles, and which was one of the airlines longest flight durations at the time, The last of these scenic tourist flights over Antarctica operated on November 28th 1979.
On November 14th 1977 the airline took delivery of its 8th and final DC-10-30 .... ZK-NZT (C/N # 46950 L/N # 242 F/F July 22nd 1977)
The frequency of AIR NEW ZEALAND services to the US west coast was further increased from December 10th 1977 .... to 10 services per week from Auckland with the introduction of yet another DC-10 service to Los Angeles via both Nadi and Honolulu.
After having been studied and rejected twice previously (during the mid 1960's and early 1970's) and then re-evaluated during the mid 1970's, the operations of both AIR NEW ZEALAND and NZNAC were merged on April 1st 1978 .... following a formal announcement by the New Zealand government on December 19th 1977. From this date NZNAC ceased to exist and became a part of AIR NEW ZEALAND. At the time of this merger the enlarged AIR NEW ZEALAND fleet was then composed of 8 B737-200, 3 DC-8-52, 8 DC-10-30, 13 F27-100, and 4 F27-500 aircraft .... and which enabled international services to some of the airlines South Pacific destinations and Norfolk Island to be operated by B737-200 and F27-500 aircraft respectively. Following the merger .... the only alteration to the external appearance of the original AIR NEW ZEALAND's international fleet was the addition of a small NZNAC Godwit logo behind the airlines TEAL based Flying Fish fuselage logo which graced the upper nose stripe on each individual aircraft .... whereas the entire domestic fleet retained its original NZNAC based red/orange livery with "AIR NEW ZEALAND" fuselage titles, Koru tail logo, and the international divisions Flying Fish fuselage logo being applied ahead of the NZNAC Godwit logo on the lower nose stripe of each individual aircraft. The merger was intended to save the New Zealand Government tens of millions of dollars each year.
From April 2nd 1978 AIR NEW ZEALAND's DC-10's began operating twice weekly direct services to Hong Kong .... and from April 26th 1978 the existing AIR NEW ZEALAND/BRITISH AIRWAYS inter-change agreement was increased to 8 services per week throughout the northern summer season. This revised arrangement resulted in the airlines DC-10's operating 5 London/Miami/London/Los Angeles services .... and 3 London/Montreal/London/Los Angeles services per week until September 30th 1978.
From September 17th 1978 DC-10's replaced the airlines DC-8's on all Auckland/Rarotonga services and this particular service was then extended to Los Angeles via Honolulu .... and an 11th frequency to Los Angeles, via Honolulu, also then commenced from December 14th 1978. By this time 5 of the airlines 11 weekly services to Los Angeles were being operated via Honolulu, 2 via both Nadi and Honolulu, 2 via Papeete, 1 via both Rarotonga and Honolulu, and 1 service via Nadi.
During December 1978 the AIR NEW ZEALAND/BRITISH AIRWAYS Los Angeles/London service inter-change agreement/DC-10 lease was further extended .... until October 31st 1980 .... and from February 1979 PAX capacity on each of the airlines 8 DC-10's was revised to an 18 First Class and 252 Economy Class configuration. This cabin re-configuration resulted in the original 2-4-2 Economy Class seating being converted to more common (among DC-10's) 2-5-2 configuration .... and a minor change to number of PAX windows in the center cabin section on each of the airlines 8 DC-10's.
DC-10-30 ZK-NZP (1978)
DC-10-30 ZK-NZS (1980)
DC-10-30 ZK-NZT (1981)
From April 1st 1979 AIR NEW ZEALAND DC-10's began operating some of the airlines peak Auckland/Christchurch services. DC-8's similarly began operating some peak Auckland/Wellington services also .... until their withdrawal from service during December 1981.
As the cost of fuel began to rise during the early 1970's (during the first oil price shock) AIR NEW ZEALAND responded by reducing MACH cruising airspeed and imposed stricter controls in respect of the use of both cabin heating and air conditioning systems .... as cost saving measures and with favorable results.
During 1974 McDONNELL-DOUGLAS incorporated a series aerodynamic modifications into the DC-10 design .... in the form of a redesigned wing root, a reshaped fuselage tail cone, a leading edge horizontal stabilizer/fuselage fairing, a vertical stabilizer leading edge/tail-engine fairing, and reduced gaps between wing control surfaces. These drag reducing enhancements were intended to result in an approximately 3% reduction in fuel burn (representing an estimated annual fuel cost saving of some $100,000 whilst also promoting an approximately 8,800 LB payload gain on long haul sectors .... evaluated by McDONNELL-DOUGLAS using an AIR NEW ZEALAND DC-10-30 operating over the Auckland/Singapore route .... the results of which were used to promote the aerodynamic modification kit offered by MDC to DC-10 operators worldwide) and were applied to all new-build aircraft and also promoted as optional modifications available for earlier production aircraft from the mid 1970's.
Among the 8 DC-10-30 aircraft operated by AIR NEW ZEALAND only ZK-NZP ever featured some of these aerodynamic enhancements. Whilst the fuel burn rate on the GE CF6-50C turbofan engine was high, ZK-NZL is reputed to have been "the most fuel efficient" of the airlines 8 DC-10-30's .... although AIR ZEALAND is also reputed to have realized slightly more favorable fuel burn figures than most other operators and throughout the period of its DC-10 operations.
Later production DC-10-30 aircraft were also built without the original exhaust/hot end engine thrust reverser mechanism. This modification resulted in shorter engine exhaust pipes .... most conspicuously evident by length the #2/tail-engine exhaust pipe on these particular DC-10 aircraft. Some earlier production aircraft were later modified to this particular standard but none of the 8 DC-10-30 aircraft operated by AIR NEW ZEALAND were ever built to, or modified, in accordance with this specification.
Seasonal peaks and troughs in PAX traffic/loadings throughout the airline industry, during the late 1970's, resulted in AIR NEW ZEALAND DC-10's being leased to foreign carriers. From March 1978 until August 1978 ZK-NZS was leased to MALAYSIAN AIRLINE SYSTEM .... followed by ZK-NZN which was also leased to MALAYSIAN AIRLINE SYSTEM from November 26th 1978 until December 16th 1978 .... and .... ZK-NZS which was similarly leased to NATIONAL AIRLINES (fleet # 85) from April 1st 1979 until October 29th 1979.
MALAYSIA AIRLINE SYSTEM/AIR NEW ZEALAND DC-10-30 ZK-NZN (1978)
No airline in the world is exempt from the imposition of accidents/incidents and the problems/inconveniences that can arise from such .... given aircraft are an essential mode of transport, mechanical machines, and do, occasionally, breakdown or suffer in service damage, that result in disruption to schedules and which can often have a significant roll-on effect. On the evening of January 6th 1977 AIR NEW ZEALAND DC-10 ZK-NZS, under the command of captain Jim COLLINS, with F/O Jock FERRIER and Hunter McEWAN, and F/E Terry REED, was struck by lightning shortly after its departure from Los Angeles. Conscious that the aircraft had sustained "some form of damage", the crew elected to dump fuel, and return to Los Angeles immediately, where a perfectly normal and precautionary landing was successfully executed .... to the applause of the aircraft's PAX. Upon inspection after landing 2 air-conditioning panels were discovered to have been burst as a result of the lightning strike .... resulting in some 10sq FT of damage to the aircraft's fuselage (ironically both panels were later discovered to have fallen on the McDONNELL-DOUGLAS facility at Long Beach, Los Angles, upon separating from the aircraft .... prompting a somewhat lighthearted gesture of appreciation being telexed to the airline a few days later and for the manner of their efficient delivery to the company). The aircraft was promptly repaired at Los Angeles and returned to service. During 1978 an AIR NEW ZEALAND DC-10 suffered a double engine surge upon departure from Brisbane, Australia. 1 engine was shut down as a precaution .... fuel was dumped .... and a safe emergency landing performed at Brisbane without damage or injury to either the aircraft or any of its PAX and crew.
On December 22nd 1978 AIR NEW ZEALAND DC-10 ZK-NZS, operating flight TE103 between Nandi and Auckland, under the command of captain Gordon VETTE with F/O Arthur DOVEY and F/E Gordon BROOKS, played a major role in one of the most incredible mercy missions ever undertaken in civil aviation history .... when a CESSNA 108 aircraft, being ferried from Pago Pago to Australia, via Norfolk Island, piloted by Jay PROCHNOW (an ex-USN pilot), suffered an ADF failure en-route and became lost over the South Pacific Ocean. Being unable to establish his precise location the pilot of the CESSNA declared an emergency, to Auckland ATC, but, the only possible assistance within the vicinity of the lost aircraft was the AIR NEW ZEALAND DC-10 flight. Appreciating the desperation of the ferry pilots situation, further complicated by the approaching dusk, and likelihood of the CESSNA having to ditch into the ocean with little chance of its pilots survival, the DC-10 crew volunteered to intervene. The AIR NEW ZEALAND crew eventually made successful VHF radio contact with the lost aircraft .... and .... after a series of navigational calculations (including an Aural Boxing technique) followed by precise sunset observations, then comparing the variation between these observations from both aircraft positions, the CESSNA's location was approximated .... aided by the lights of the PENROD oil rig that were later sighted by the lost aircraft and which was, at the time, being towed from Auckland to Singapore. Having determined the oil rigs precise position the crew of the DC-10 were then able to provide a magnetic steer directly toward Norfolk Island (without ever having sighted the stricken aircraft), where the CESSNA eventually landed safely after having been airborne for some 23 hours. The DC-10 continued on to Auckland where it arrived hours later than its scheduled arrival time .... its crew being hailed as heroes by the international media. In recognition of this accomplishment captain Gordon VETTE was later nominated for, and received, both the JOHNSON MEMORIAL AWARD (issued by THE GUILD OF AIR PILOTS & NAVIGATORS) and the PRESIDENTS AWARD (issued by McDONNELL-DOUGLAS). The story of this event was later dramatized (but factually distorted/over-exaggerated) by a US made movie entitled "MERCY MISSION - THE RESCUE OF FLIGHT 771" .... starring Scott BAKULA and Robert LOGGIA.
On June 7th 1979 a major crisis occurred and which impacted all DC-10 operators around the world. The FAA suspended the airworthiness certificate for all DC-10 TYPE aircraft following the crash of an AMERICAN AIRLINES DC-10-10 (N110AA) upon T/O from Chicago's O'Hare International Airport, on May 25th 1979, after the # 1 engine and pylon separated from this particular aircraft, resulting in substantial systems damage, a loss of flight control, and the consequential loss of both the aircraft and 271 lives. Intense, ill-informed, and irresponsible media coverage of this event .... relatively soon after the 1974 TURKISH AIRLINES DC-10-10 disaster at Paris .... and an unfortunate succession of other DC-10 related accidents/incidents prior to, and after, this particular event .... created unjustified public, and in some cases even airline/industry, misapprehension in regard to the integrity of the DC-10 design .... until investigations into the AA crash eventually "proved conclusively" that non-standard/non-authorized maintenance procedures were the factor which not only precipitated the AA accident, but, were also the root cause behind similar potential failings discovered later on other DC-10-10 aircraft operated by both CONTINENTAL AIRLINES and UNITED AIR LINES during the course of investigations into the AA disaster .... and which resulted in substantial fines/penalties being imposed upon each of these 3 operators. However .... "within the public mind" .... the damage had been done and was of such a magnitude that many miss-led travelers actually began to avoid carriers operating DC-10 aircraft for a considerably long period afterward. Given that AIR NEW ZEALAND's international service network was supported almost exclusively by its DC-10-30 fleet the airline was particularly hard-hit by the FAA imposed grounding and associated negative public perception of the aircraft. Protested by foreign operators around the world this ban was partially lifted on June 22nd 1979 enabling DC-10 services to be resumed by all other than US operators/registered aircraft and into all but US territories and airspace .... for which the FAA grounding remained in-force until July 14th 1979.
During this particular crisis 2 AIR NEW ZEALAND DC-8's (the 3rd aircraft was undergoing heavy maintenance at the airlines Auckland engineering base prior to the onset of this particular crisis crisis) struggled to maintain the airlines services (including uninterrupted DC-8 services from Wellington) .... only the imposition of the DC-10 grounding then impacted the airline even more severely when 1 of its 2 operational D-C8's was damaged as the result of an axle/truk failure incident upon departure from Honolulu on June 18th 1979 .... reducing the airlines long-range fleet to "just 1 aircraft". Meanwhile .... a PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS B747-100 was chartered to operate 6 round-trip services between Auckland and Los Angeles in order to cope with the accumulating PAX backlog .... along with a DC-8 SUPER 63CF which was similarly chartered from FLYING TIGERS to address the airlines accumulating freight backlog. 2 of the airlines B737-200 aircraft that were configured for over water/international operations serviced some of the airlines routes to and from Australian and South Pacific ports throughout the period of the DC-10 grounding. The FAA grounding was the primary factor which contributed to AIR NEW ZEALAND recording a $15.4 million dollar loss for the 1979/1980 financial year (April 1st 1979 - March 31st 1980).
Things were to get worse though later during 1979 .... much worse ....
On November 28th 1979 DC-10-30 ZK-NZP, operating flight TE901, under the command of captain Jim COLLINS with F/O's Gregory CASSIN and Graeme LUCAS, and F/E's Gordon BROOKS and Nick MALONEY, was written-off at Mount Erebus, Antarctica, during the airlines last Antarctic sightseeing flight of the 1979 season .... with the loss of all 257 PAX and crew aboard the aircraft. This was AIR NEW ZEALAND's first (and only) loss of a commercial flight. What became known as became "The Erebus Disaster" also became one of the most, if not "THE MOST", complex air accident investigations in civil aviation history with allegations of "administrative failure" and "pilot error" forming the conclusion of 2 separate formal inquiries into the crash. The report of the Chief inspector Of Air Accidents, and that of the later Royal Commission Of Inquiry into the disaster, disagreed in respect of the fundamental cause/s of this accident. Who was to blame .... and .... can anyone in particular be blamed .... remain the subject of often intense debate today. It is true that AIR NEW ZEALAND had, originally, implemented a 16,000 FT MSA whilst overflying any region of continental Antarctica. But who conducts a sightseeing flight at such altitude ? Consequently .... and due to the "unique nature" of these flights .... a dispensation was sought, and approved by the NZCAD, which authorized later Antarctic flights to descend to "any altitude authorized by local ATC" (in order to provide PAX with a decent view of the scenic beauty of this last vast great frontier) .... provided no snow showers and 40 mile visibility prevailed and both descent and all flight at low altitude were radar co-ordinated. No concern was ever formally expressed, at the time, by either the NZCAD or controlling USN/USAF operations within the Antarctic in regard to this proposal or in relation to any of the sightseeing flights then being undertaken by both AIR NEW ZEALAND and QANTAS AIRWAYS. It is also true that after the airlines 1977 Antarctic program all such flights were routed up McMurdo Sound .... well clear of high terrain .... to follow the established USN/USAF/military supply route into McMurdo Base, but, it was later acknowledged that this particular amendment was unintentional and the result of a minor typographical/navigational error when the master flight plan was first computerized during 1978 .... and which remained undetected until the week prior to the accident flight. It is true also that upon being reported to the airlines Navigation Section this particular error was corrected the night/hours prior to the departure of the accident flight .... only during the correction process yet another inadvertent typographical error was committed which resulted in the aircraft flight track being shifted not just a few miles east of the established flight track to McMurdo, but rather, by almost 30 miles east of the intended destination end way-point .... and which then, unintentionally, routed the aircrafts flightpath directly at/over Mount Erebus rather than down McMurdo Sound as had been assumed .... with tragic consequences. Meanwhile .... prior to the discovery of this discrepancy .... the crew of the accident flight had already been briefed on the McMurdo Sound route, but, were not informed (per word-of-mouth or OPS FLASH) of any alteration to their particular flight plan for what became the November 28th 1979 flight. This is the basic sequence of events which led up to and made the accident possible.
Had weather/meteorological conditions, at the accident site, been anything other than they were that day .... and .... had commercial pilots, of that era, and this crew in particular, been briefed in respect of the potential dangers of "clear air and sector white-out" .... as their military/polar trained counterparts were .... and had the alteration to the flight plan been advised to the crew prior to the aircraft's departure from Auckland, then, this particular disaster would likely not ever have occurred. The meticulous and independent pre-flight preparation, by the crew (the captain in particular), based on the airlines original briefing material, had suddenly been invalidated by the non-communicated amendment to their flight plan .... resulting in the crew, and their aircraft, ultimately being programmed to fly to different destinations. As the crew entered the navigation data into the aircraft AINS on the morning of their flight they were, unwittingly, inserting a death sentence for themselves and their PAX and crew .... to that extent that this particular flight was effectively doomed before it ever departed Auckland. Any possibility of the navigational discrepancy being detected, by way of visual referencing to surrounding geographic/Antarctic terrain, was, coincidentally, masked by polar visual illusions imposed by nature itself .... in a series of unique (to Antarctic regions), but, dramatic meteorological circumstances, that resulted in a 12,500 FT mountain literally "disappearing" from view, "IN CLEAR AIR", and beneath the low cloud cover. No snow showers and a 40 mile visibility prevailed within the vicinity of McMurdo Base and the route the aircraft was expected to fly that day, but, with a low overcast and the sun at its seasonal low axis also. McMurdo ATC had invited the DC-10 down to 1,500 FT .... on radar vectors. Satisfied that all of the necessary pre-requisites for a safe let-down were established, and confident their pre-programmed AINS was navigating the aircraft down McMurdo Sound .... as expected .... and in accordance with their pre-flight briefing of several days earlier .... the crew had no indication, nor reason to suspect, they were not now proceeding down McMurdo Sound, but rather, were being flown directly toward the slopes of Mount Erebus near Lewis Bay (flying at 1,500 FT down McMurdo Sound presents no danger, but, flying at 1,500 FT into Lewis Bay results in a direct collision course with the lower slopes of Mount Erebus) ..... due to their amended flight track and physical similarities between the entrance to McMurdo Sound and Lewis Bay. By almost 26 miles north of McMurdo Base, and not being able to sight any of the geographic features they expected to able see in the distance ahead of them by this particular stage of their approach (given the reported 40 mile visibility), and with radio transmissions between the aircraft and McMurdo ATC faltering intermittently (undoubtedly blocked by the large mass of terrain between both stations during different stages of the aircraft's orbiting descent .... and which also undoubtedly obscured the aircraft radar return at McMurdo ATC .... probably dismissed as solar flare influences), the crew became apprehensive of the conditions ahead of them and elected to vacate the area. They were, in fact, discussing their safest climbout option/s, and without any obvious urgency, when the vertical scanning GPWS suddenly activated .... to which the captain calmly, and immediately, responded .... by ordering "Go-Around Power" .... only to impact an undulating lower slope of Mt.Erebus less than 6 seconds later .... a mountain which had remained "COMPLETELY INVISIBLE" to the entire crew throughout their unwitting and clear air approach toward it. Due to the deceptive nature of "sector white out" (imposing a loss of distance perception as well as depth and surface contour) what this particular crew were confronted with was a featureless expanse of blank/white slope with the summit of the mountain, ahead of them, concealed within cloud and which created a sharp line of differential at its base, to basically emulate a (false) horizon in the far distance.
The subsequent investigation into (1) how this disaster was able to occur and (2) why the crew were unable to detect the rising terrain ahead of them became as devious as the accident cause/s were complex .... particularly in regard to the matter of "perceived culpability". It should be appreciated that AIR NEW ZEALAND, during this particular era, was a government/state owned enterprise .... managed by government appointees .... each eager to limit liability and be absolved of responsibility for the accident .... "at the expense of the aircrew". From a government/political perspective (particularly in regard to its decision to release the Chief Inspector Of Air Accidents report "PRIOR TO" its convention of the later Royal Commission Of Inquiry into the disaster) it was a white-wash (if not an attempt to influence the course of the inquiry) in as much as the accident was the result of a white-out event. The Royal Commission Of Inquiry into the disaster eventually exonerated the aircrew (they were "NOT" responsible for the disaster and committed "NO" errors leading up to its occurrence) and declared that administrative functions, rather than individual persons, within the airline system were the prime cause/s of the accident .... much to the dissatisfaction of both the government and its implicated administrative airline appointees and CAD representatives. This inquiry ultimately evolved into an inquiry which eventually inquired into the foundation and validity of the Royal Commissioners findings and decision. The case was analysed/debated within the highest courts in New Zealand, and at Privy Council level in the UK, as certain individuals sought to absolve themselves of "perceived implication". Upon appeal to it the the Privy Council "did not" overturn the Royal Commissioners findings as to cause/s of the disaster, but, the Chief Inspector Of Air Accidents report was ultimately upheld .... "as far as the New Zealand government was concerned" .... and which maintained that "Pilot Error", rather than corporate/administrative blunder, was the fundamental cause of the crash .... whilst quietly acknowledging minor failings within itself, the airline, and the countries regulatory CAD. During 1999, some 20 years after the disaster, the New Zealand Government tabled, at the recommendation of Parliament, the Report Of The Royal Commission Of Inquiry into the disaster. This should have been the last act/word on the Erebus disaster .... and as a matter of process it should also then have formally exonerated the crew in eyes of the government (through it superseding the Chief Inspector Of Air Accidents original report) .... but .... it didn't .... and the disaster, and it cause/s, despite being scientifically proven (aided by captain Gordon VETTE's studies into aviation psychology and visual perception .... backed by leading scientists from around the world), remain unresolved to this day .... almost 40 years after the event. What, if anything more (should any form of suppression have been imposed in respect of past evidence), is revealed, or might transpire after the passing of a legal statute of 50 years remains to be seen. As is often the result of any major air accident the legacy of this particular disaster is that the world did, as a direct result of its occurrence, become a much safer place to fly in.... albeit at the cost of 257 lives. There have been no further commercial tourist/scenic overflights of Antarctica. The isolation, remoteness, and limitation of resources within the region (in event of any emergency or accident occurring in the future) proving too great a risk/venture. Valuable lessons were taught by the Erebus disaster. The carelessness which promoted the accidents occurrence and the tactics/"legal blame game" which prevailed throughout its investigation are a reflection of both the government and airline management "of that particular era". The airline quickly recovered .... and moved forward. That is the way of the aviation industry. AIR NEW ZEALAND, today, the pain/wounds of the Erebus disaster behind it, has since evolved into an entirely different company .... and one of the worlds most "highly regarded" international airlines as it now enters its 75th year of operations (1940 - 2015).
The Erebus disaster .... occurring only 4 weeks after the WESTERN AIRLINES DC-10-10 (N903WA) accident, at Mexico City, on October 31st 1979, resulting in the loss of 73 lives (the aircraft struck construction equipment upon landing on the wrong runway) .... did nothing to subdue the bitter, media manipulated, and negative public perception of the DC-10 which had followed the AA disaster at Chicago during May 1979 .... all of which had transpired during a critical (possibly even pivotal) time for McDONNELL-DOUGLAS and during what had already been a particularly bad year for AIR NEW ZEALAND, the DC10/MDONNELL-DOUGLAS, and world aviation safety generally.
Despite valuable lessons having previously been learned computer based error was to play a major role in what might have had potential to become yet another accident .... 13 moths after occurrence of the Erebus disaster. Incorrect fuel computations were generated within the flight plan for an AIR NEW ZEALAND DC-10 service to Rarotonga/Cook Islands on December 4th 1980. Had it not been for the alertness/competence of the flight crew "prior to" their departure from Auckland .... then .... potential for a 2nd disaster might have resulted, but, likely would not have occurred anyway due to the mandatory procedures associated with flight planning/despatching and that had enabled this particular error to be detected. This incident resulted in an internal inquiry and became known as "The 4th Of December Incident".
Prior to these events AIR NEW ZEALAND .... among other major airlines/DC-10 operators around the world (including the KSSU group) .... had been a significant motivation behind McDONNELL-DOUGLAS developing what was (then) mooted to become its larger/stretched "DC-10 SUPER 60 SERIES" aircraft .... as a prospective replacement for, and addition to, the worlds DC-10 fleets. However .... the impact of the "late 1970's" DC-10 accidents/incidents (which were in no way attributable to the integrity of the aircraft design), and to some extent McDONNELL-DOUGLAS's own commercial situation also (the company was heavily committed to MD-80/90 development and production throughout the 1980's and was unable to launch/fund another parallel project), saw its anticipated stretched/SUPER DC-10 project postponed until the mid 1980's .... and by which time it had evolved into the MD-11. AIRBUS INDUSTRIE, during the late 1970's/early 1980's era simply did not offer a high-capacity long range contending aircraft design comparable to either the B747-200/300/SP, DC-10-30/-40, or L-1011 100/200/500 .... and which forced many traditionally McDONNELL-DOUGLAS-loyal airline clients .... including AIR NEW ZEALAND .... "to have to" move toward the B747-200 rather delay their DC-10 fleet replacement programs until availability of the MD11 during 1990.
Then came the Kolker report, during early 1980, which was commissioned by the New Zealand government in order to analyse and make recommendations in regard to the future financial viability and profitability of AIR NEW ZEALAND .... and which criticized the airlines decision to re-equip with B747's among other details. Its recommendations were rejected by both the government and the airline (dismissed as "amateurish") which was already committed to its intended redevelopment strategy and regardless of the implications of the report .... but .... which history has also since proven was indeed the best direction for the airline to pursue.
Consequently, on June 12th 1980, AIR NEW ZEALAND signed a contract with BOEING for the purchase of 5 B747-200B's for delivery between May 1981 and August 1982 .... the first 3 of these particular aircraft being ordered, built, and delivered to the airline within the, then, record time (for BOEING) of just 15 months.
The first B747-200B (ZK-NZV) was delivered to AIR NEW ZEALAND on May 29th 1981.
As the airlines B747 fleet strength was slowly increased these aircraft progressively replaced DC-10's on the airlines most prestigious international routes .... with the service frequency on some of these routes actually being reduced due to the greater capacity of the B747's.
Meanwhile ....
DC-10's began operating AIR NEW ZEALAND's twice weekly Auckland/Tokyo service, direct, from March 27th 1981 .... 1 week earlier than originally planned. This service had been inaugurated on August 1st 1980 .... operating via Nadi .... and using a DC-8-52 (ZK_NZC) which had been refurbished especially for this particular long-haul route. Tokyo was the last of the airlines new destinations to be serviced by both DC8 and DC10 aircraft prior to the introduction of its new B747-200B fleet.
Throughout the final 2 years of AIR NEW ZEALAND's DC-10 operations the New Zealand flag was applied to the upper fuselage of these aircraft .... and across airlines entire fleet as the airline introduced its "FLY THE FLAG WE'RE NUMBER ONE" advertising campaign of the early 1980's. During this same period the length of the engine stripe (on the under wing engines only on its DC-10's) which had formed part of the AIR NEW ZEALAND DC-8 and DC-10 voyaging canoe livery, introduced during 1972, was also adjusted .... with some aircraft featuring the original full-length engine nacelle stripe, whilst others supported both half and quarter length engine nacelle striping.
DC-10-30 ZK-NZQ (1982)
DC-10-30 ZK-NZR (1983)
ZK-NZN became the first of the airlines 7 remaining DC-10 aircraft to depart the fleet .... being sold to ILFC on April 14th 1981 and then leased to WESTERN AIRLINES as N821L.
WESTERN AIRLINES DC-10-30 N821L (1981) - ex ZK-NZN
This transaction became the first ever sale of a foreign owned DC10 to a US carrier. During its service with WESTERN AIRLINES this particular aircraft was also sub-leased to AIR PACIFIC to operate the airlines new Nadi/Honolulu/Los Angeles service from September 21st 1983 until December 28th 1984 when it was returned to ILFC. Having been a BAC ONE-ELEVEN and B737-200 operator and operating a small route network within the Pacific islands and to both Australia, and New Zealand, the DC-10 became AIR PACIFIC's first association with wide body jetliners and long-haul services.
AIR PACIFIC DC-10-30 N821L (1983) - ex ZK-NZN
AIR PACIFIC DC-10-30 N821L (1984) - ex ZK-NZN
This aircraft was then sold to AMERICAN AIRLINES on January 3rd 1985, as N144AA, and with whom it served until its withdrawal from service during December 2000 and storage at Mojave, California, USA. It was then sold to GA TELESIS TURBINE TECHNOLOGIES LLC on April 26th 2002 and scrapped later during 2002.
AMERICAN AIRLINES DC-10-30 N144AA (1985) - ex ZK-NZN
From June 13th 1982 and June 29th 1982 ZK-NZT and ZK-NZS were both leased to LAN CHILE for 4 years .... as CC-CJT ("Valparaiso" fleet # 102) and CC-CJS ("Santiago" fleet # 101) respectively. These particular aircraft became the first long range wide-body equipment to be operated by LAN CHILE which had previously operated its long haul routes using B707-320B aircraft.
LAN CHILE DC-10-30 CC-CJS "Valparaiso" (1982) - ex ZK-NZS
LAN CHILE DC-10-30 CC-CJT "Santiago" (1982) - ex ZK-NZT
Upon the exipry of its LAN CHILE lease CC-CJT was sold to ILFC during March 1986. It was then onsold to AMERICAN AIRLINES on June 17th 1986, as N164AA, and with whom it operated until its withdrawal from service during December 2000 and storage at Mojave, California, USA. On June 25 2001 it was sold to PACIFIC AIRCORP 46950 INC, then onsold to ART 46950 LLC on July 2nd 2003 and stored at Marana, Arizona, USA.
CC-CJS returned to AIR NEW ZEALAND, at Auckland, on July 8th 1986, upon the conclusion of its LAN CHILE lease and was sold to ILFC on August 1st 1986 .... then onsold to SAS, as SE-DFH ("Rurik Viking"), and by whom it was operated until October 10th 1990.
SCANDINAVIAN AIRLINE SYSTEM DC-10-30 SE-DFH "Rurik Viking" (1990) - ex ZK-NZS
During its SAS service this aircraft was also leased to the airlines SCANAIR subsidiary .... from October 4th 1986 until March 30th 1987 .... when it returned to SAS service.
SCANAIR DC-10-30 SE-DFH "Rurik Viking" (1987) - ex ZK-NZS
It was then sold to ELECTRA AVIATION on October 10th 1990 and leased to AIR OUTRE MER, as F-ODLY ("Turquoise"), then transferred to AOM FRENCH AIRLINES on March 1st 1992 after the AIR OUTRE MER/AOM merger .... and during which tie it also briefly supported the AIR MINERVE logo.
AIR OUTRE MER DC-10-30 "Turquoise" F-ODLY (1992) - ex ZK-NZS
AOM/AIR MINERVE DC-10-30 F-ODLY F-ODLY (1992) - ex ZK-NZS
This particular aircraft was also operated by AOM in conjunction with CUANA DE AVIATION during the mid 1990's ....
AOM F-ODLY DC-10-30 F-ODLY (1994) - ex ZK-NZS
AOM/CUBANA DC-10-30 F-ODLY (1995) - ex ZK-NZS
.... sold to AOM on October 5th 1999 and re-registered F-GTLY on May 5th 2000.
AOM DC-10-30 F-GTLY (2001) - ex ZK-NZS
It was next transferred to AIR LIB on October 28th 2001 after the AOM/AIR LIBERTE merger and with whom it remained until its withdrawal from service during February 2003 and storage at Havana, Cuba.
AIR LIB DC-10-30 F-GTLY (2002) - ex ZK-NZS
This particular aircraft was then sold to SOCIETE NORMANDIE D'ENTERPRISES SARL on October 17th 2005 although the aircraft remained at Havana and has since been used as a ground handling instructional training airframe by CENTRO DE ENTRENIMIENTO AERONAUTICO/CUBANA. This particular aircraft (as of 2017) is the only remaining example of the once 8-strong fleet of AIR NEW ZEALAND DC-10-30's. Investigations, and a campaign under the "BRING OUR BIRDS HOME" banner, were launched during March of this year (2017), to try and acquire this airframe and have it returned to New Zealand, for preservation and display as the aircraft type which ultimately ushered AIR NEW ZEALAND into the "Wide Body Jet Era".
ZK-NZM was sold to AMERICAN AIRLINES on July 16th 1982, as N137AA, and with whom it served until its withdrawal from service and storage at Mojave, California, USA from November 2000. It was then sold to GA TELESIS TURBINE TECHNOLOGIES LLC on April 26 2002,
AMERICAN AIRLINES DC-10-30 N137AA (1982) - ex ZK-NZM
ZK-NZQ was also sold to AMERICAN AIRLINES on September 17th 1982, as N138AA. It was then sold to POLARIS LEASING CORPORATION during January 1994 and leased back to AMERICAN AIRLINES until October 1993 when it was withdrawn from service, and stored at Marana, Arizona, USA. It was next sold to CONTINENTAL AIRLINES on January 19th 1996, where it became N14074 (fleet # 074) and with whom it operated until it was finally withdrawn from service during August 2001 and stored at Mojave, California, USA. This particular aircraft was then sold to CONTINENTAL AIRLINES PURCHASING SERVICES on November 30th 2001 and scrapped during 2008.
AMERICAN AIRLINES DC-10-30 N138AA (1982) - ex ZK-NZQ
ZK-NZL too was sold to AMERICAN AIRLINES, as N136AA, on October 21st 1981. It was then sold to POLARIS LEASING CORPORATION during January 1984 and leased back to AMERICAN AIRLINES .... and by whom it was written-off/damaged beyond repair as the result of an aborted T/O attempt at Dallas FW, Texas, on May 21st 1988.
AMERICAN AIRLINES DC-10-30 N136AA (1981) - ex ZK-NZL
ZK-NZR became the last DC-10-30 to remain in AIR NEW ZEALAND service .... and flew its final commercial service for the airline on November 2nd 1983, operating between Hong Kong and Auckland, under the command of captain Ian HUTCHINS.
This particular aircraft was sold to ILFC on December 18th 1982 and leased to LINHAS AEREAS DE MOCAMBIQUE, as F-GDJK ("Maputo"). It was then sold to EQUATOR LEASING INC during September 1991 and leased back to LAM until May 2th 1992 when it was temporarily withdrawn from service and stored at Le Bourget, Paris, France.
LINHAS AEREAS DE MOCAMBIQUE DC-10-30 F-GDJK "Maputo" (1983) - ex ZK-NZR
LINHAS AEREAS DE MOCAMBIQUE DC-10-30 F-GDJK "Maputo" (1986) - ex ZK-NZR
This aircraft was then leased to AIR MARTINIQUE from May 27th 1992 until September 1993. It was next leased to AOM FRENCH AIRLINES, as F-GNDC, from October 12th 1993 and sold to the airline during March 1996 .... and during the mid 1990's was briefly operated by AOM in conjunction with CUBANA DE AVIACION.
AOM DC-10-30 F-GNDC (1993) - ex ZK-NZR
AOM/CUBANA DC-10-30 F-GNDC (1995) - ex ZK-NZR
Between 1998 and 2000 this particular aircraft supported the airlines "Les Animaux WWF promotional livery to publicize the plight of some of the worlds most endangered tropical wildlife species ....
AOM DC-10-30 F-GNDC (1998) "Les Animaux" WWF livery - ex ZK-NZR
.... then sold to RECHERCHE AVIATION GROUPE SA and leased back to AOM from April 18th 2001, and then transferred to AIR LIB on October 28th 2001 after the AOM/AIR LIB merger. It was next sold to SAS RECHERCE AVIATION GROUPE on January 1st 2002 and leased back to AIR LIB, and then sold to the airline on November 22nd 2002 and stored at Chateauroux, France. This particular aircraft was finally sold to AVICO on July 25th 2003 and scrapped during August 2004.
AIR NEW ZEALAND's disposal of its entire DC-10 fleet, between 1981 and 1983, was undertaken during a difficult economic period for much of the worlds airline industry .... and at a time during which the reputation of the DC-10 was still recovering from having been "unnecessarily slandered" as the result of the spate of unfortunate high-profile late 1970's incidents/accidents that were completely unrelated to the integrity of the aircraft design. The airline also reported a $32.5 million loss for the 1982/1983 financial tear (April 1st 1982 - March 31st 1983), but, its rapid move to the B747 .... and transition of its entire international fleet to an all BOEING affair .... along with the acquisition of BOEING support equipment, tooling/spares inventories, and training .... had not come cheaply. In any case this considerable loss was off-set by a $33.6 million profit realized from the sale of 4 of the airlines DC-10's within the same period also .... each of which had been sold in excess of their actual book value.
The DC-10-30 was a highly advanced (for its time) and well engineered aircraft (despite the infidelity of its original cargo door locking mechanism and certain intricacies which led some operators to circumvent authorized maintenance procedures as a cost/time saving exercise and which unwittingly resulted in major problems during the 1970's) that was, in a number of respects, technologically superior to the B747 .... until the advent of the more advanced B747-400 and other 1980's introduced hi-tech BOEING and AIRBUS aircraft types. Most crews were enamored with the aircraft .... to the extent that some (foreign crews) even declined upgrades to later aircraft technology in order to remain on DC-10's specifically .... and eventually migrated to other airlines/DC10 operators as these aircraft were progressively replaced. The DC-10 offered 3-engine economy (prior to the advent long-range operations by large twin-engine aircraft types such as the B767, B777, and more recently the B787) over similar range and routes operated by 4-engine jetliners throughout the 1970's, 80's, 90's, and into the new millennium .... whilst also offering a more gradual/conservative step-up toward JUMBO/B747 type capacity .... which many of the worlds leading airlines simply weren't ready for when the B747 first entered service during the early 1970's. Whilst it was initially slow to sell/appeal to the worlds airlines and very nearly did not enter production, DC10 sales accelerated rapidly from the late 1960's, and throughout the 1970's, and into the 1980's, to outsell its prime competitor, the L-1011, by a considerable margin .... with some 446 airframes having been produced by McDONNELL-DOUGLAS by the time DC-10/KC-10 production terminated during 1988. The last DC10-30 was delivered to NIGERIA AIRWAYS (5H-AUI and later re-registered N3024W) on July 27th 1989 .... and the worlds last ever commercial DC-10 flight was operated by BANGLADESH BIMAN AIRWAYS (S2-ACR "New Era"), between Birmingham and Dacca, on February 24th 2014.
The DC-10 was "the aircraft" which ushered AIR NEW ZEALAND into the first generation 1970's JUMBO/wide-body bulk transport era of commercial aviation .... and which enabled it to not only substantially increase its PAX/freight capacity, but also, to extend its international route network and influence further abroad than ever before .... and to offer even greater standards of service and comfort (the quality for which AIR NEW ZEALAND .... "in particular" .... has since become internationally acclaimed) .... to be recognized, today, as one of the greatest, and most successful, international airlines among the worlds leading air carriers .... "NOT TOO BAD AT ALL FOR A LITTLE COUNTRY LIKE NEW ZEALAND".
Mark C
AKL/NZ
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